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ersonifications in medieval literature have for the greater part 
appeared in female form. In being personified, an abstract concept 
is translated to a “sentient human capable of thought and language, 
possessing voice and face.”1 The concept receives a human identity, and 
included in that identity is gender. Which gender it receives is partly 
dependent on the grammatical gender of the noun, and this explains why 
personifications are mostly female: abstract nouns tend to be feminine. 
However, the implications of the social identity of personifications 
should not be disregarded. Even if grammar determines the gender of a 
personification, it is clear that the gender of a personified figure in its 
turn determines how this figure is described, what she can and cannot 
do, and how she relates to others in a narrative. In fact, it is plausible that 
the female gender of personifications is essential to how that personifica-
tion functions, so that grammatical gender would be overruled if it would 
not align with social gender. So, when asking why personifications are 
so often female, it makes sense not to draw the line at grammar.
Therefore, we should not reduce personifications to grammar, but 
neither should we do the reverse and reduce them to the concepts that 
they stand for. The latter is a way of thinking about personifications 
that is apparent in Barbara Newman’s book God and the Goddesses: 




Vision, Poetry, and Belief in the Middle Ages.2 This book was the first to 
comprehensively engage with the gender of personifications. It brilliantly 
describes how feminine aspects of God are personified and function as 
mediators between humans and the divine. Newman calls these allegori-
cal figures “goddesses” instead of “female personifications” in order to 
stress the fact that these figures were not mere literary ornaments, but 
instead enjoyed a high degree of spiritual reality and were integral to 
the kind of thinking that she calls “imaginative theology.”
3
 However, 
Newman starts out from the observation that “[t]o conceive of god-
desses . . . is not to evince any particular attitude toward women. It is 
simply to exercise the religious imagination.”
4
 I want to suggest that 
Newman’s own book indicates otherwise. I do not contradict the fact 
that many medieval personifications carry deep spiritual meaning, only 
that this would make them immune to social meaning. We should not 
deem personifications, as representations of the religious imagination, 
to be uninfluenced by the workings of social identity. Gender is essential 
to ideational constructs as well.
5
 
Many scholars have expanded these grammatical and theological 
views on female personifications to explanations based on gender theory. 
In this article, I would like to map the different theories that have been 
proposed and offer a framework for uniting them. The problem with 
the literature on this subject is not that there is a lack of valuable propo-
sitions, but rather that most authors position themselves exclusively 
against the theory of grammatical determinism and not in relation to 
2. Barbara Newman, God and the Goddesses: Vision, Poetry, and Belief in the Middle 
Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).
3. Newman, 292-304. Newman defines imaginative theology as follows: 
“Imaginative theology is the pursuit of serious religious and theological thought 
through the techniques of imaginative literature, especially vision, dialogue, and 
personification” (292).
4. Newman, 39.
5. As is attested to by the work of Caroline Walker Bynum: Jesus As Mother: Studies 
In the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1982); Holy Feast and Holy Fast: the Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Fragmentation and Redemption: 




other theories. Because of this, multiple partial theories exist whose only 
lack is that they claim exclusivity; they actually do not contradict each 
other, but can, on the contrary, be fitted into one framework. 
I want to base this framework, first, on the existing research on sex, 
gender, and sexuality in the Middle Ages. The field is enormously fruit-
ful, which will allow me to build my arguments about personification 
on these theories without further argumentation on my part about the 
nature of medieval sex, gender, and sexuality; references will suffice.
6
 I 
will only give an introduction as to how this literature corresponds to 
the theoretical framework that I want to use, which is Simone de Beau-
voir’s existential philosophy of gender as developed in The Second Sex. 
Of special interest here is the relation between binary and hierarchical 
conceptions of gender. I will then bring together in this framework the 
critical literature on personification allegory by giving an overview of the 
arguments that are used to explain the female gender of personifications. 
I will distinguish three levels to which these explanations refer: the 
personifier, the personified, and the personification as a literary figure. 
The first is the representation of a female figure at the literal level; the 
second is the idea that is represented by that female figure and after 
which she is named; and the third is the literary practice of personifica-
tion. These terms are borrowed from James Paxson, who models them 
on the structuralist concept of a sign as consisting of a signifier and a 
signified. The personifier is described by him as “a standardized nar-
rative actant: s/he is a mobile and active human being, endowed with 
speech, and representative of a specific psychological, physiological, 
and ideological constitution.”
7
 The personified is what gets “figurally 
translated into the personifier.”8 
My goal is to show that the same concepts reappear at every level. 
6. My main sources are the work of Caroline Walker Bynum (see note 5); Framing 
medieval bodies, ed. Sarah Kay and Miri Rubin (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1994); Ruth Mazo Karras, Sexuality in Medieval Europe: Doing Unto Others 
(New York: Routledge, 2005); The Oxford Handbook of Women and Gender in 
Medieval Europe, ed. Judith M. Bennett and Ruth Mazo Karras (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013).




These concepts that one finds governing the ideational value of the 
personified concept as well as the dominant literary discourse about per-
sonification are the same ones that structure gender relations. Therefore, 
the choice for a female personification character indicates a use of the 
social structures of gender at every level of the personification allegory. 
In short, the article provides a structured overview of research that cor-
roborates the hypothesis that the appearance of female personifications 
as literary figures entails the use of women’s bodies both as bearers of 
symbolism and gender roles in a patriarchal society.
I define personification, following Paxson, as “the translation of any 
non-human quantity into a sentient human capable of thought and 
language, possessing voice and face.”
9
 Paxson categorizes personifica-
tion as a subset of anthropomorphism (“the figural translation of any 
non-human quantity into a character that has human form”), which is 
in turn the subset of the general category substantialization (“the fig-
ural translation of any non-corporeal quantity into a physical, corporeal 
one”).
10
 A personification figure has to possess voice and face, which 
means that the figure should be described and should speak. Personi-
fication allegory is thus more than a trope. To say that the Church is 
the mother of the faithful is to use personification as a trope, but the 
Church becomes an allegorical character only when her appearance is 
described in a text, when she interacts with her children and speaks to 
them.
11
 This is the actual subject of the article, but because there is 
much useful literature on the use of the gendered metaphors closely 
connected to these personifications, I will also refer tothis literature to 
corroborate my argument.
Personifications may embody either “concepts, values, abstractions or 
9. Paxson, 42.
10. Paxson, 42.
11. Paxson distinguishes between personification figures, which are “all imple-
mentings of the trope personification in narrative, in the short lyric, in drama, in 
non-verbal arts, in rhetorically ornamental fictional dialogue or in everyday speech,” 
and personification characters, which is “the employment of the trope in the narrato-
rial invention of actual characters, objects, or places that occupy the material space-





 This article focuses on those “concepts, values, abstrac-
tions or generalities” that are valued positively, because it is there that 
modern (and sometimes pre-modern) readers discern a paradox: why 
would a society that generally devalues the feminine in favor of the 
masculine represent its highest, most noble or most divine concepts as 
women? Of course, what also has to be taken into account is the sheer 
force of tradition. The decisive factor in making personifications female 
is the fact that there is a literary tradition of female personification. Still, 
it is the way in which the gender of these personifications is then used 
rhetorically that is of interest here. Furthermore, my framework only 
seeks to explain the female gender of personifications on the theoreti-
cal level; how personifications might function in the practice of reading 
and what ethical implications might follow is not further elaborated.
This article gives a structured overview of the hypotheses that have 
been posited with regard to the female gender of personifications in 
medieval literature. Sometimes these hypotheses are founded on texts 
from other historical periods as well; I take these into account when I 
think they may prove useful for medieval texts. I have thus tried to be 
as inclusive as possible, with the consequence of making generalizations 
that disregard the specificity of historical periods, literary genres, and 
individual authors. However, my article is meant first and foremost as an 
aid to further and more specific research on the topic. Not all hypotheses 
will apply equally to any specific personification or allegorical text, nor 
will they apply as straightforwardly and harmoniously as is assumed 
here. Especially considering the fact that the concept of gender itself 
is constantly in motion and made up of constantly shifting relations, it 
is obvious that a general framework can never capture this complexity. 
However, a broad overview of all the elements that could be taken into 
account when assessing female personifications can still be useful. It 
can provide a touchstone for measuring the similarities between and 
specificities of individual texts. 
12. Daisy Delogu, Allegorical Bodies: Power and Gender in Late Medieval France 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 20.
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Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy of Gender and 
Medieval Conceptions of Gender
I want to build my framework on the principles structuring gender rela-
tions that we can derive from Simone de Beauvoir’s classical work The 
Second Sex. This existential-phenomenological study of gender looks at 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s process of “othering” in its most basic form, namely 
the relation between man and woman.
13
 Just as every individual is a 
radically free self who reduces others to the objects of his/her conscious-
ness, woman has been made the object in relation to man the subject: 
“She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with 
reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the 
essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other.”
14
 
Woman is thus defined as the object of a subject that is both positive 
and neutral. When she is opposed to man, she is viewed negatively. In a 
binary opposition, man and woman, or masculinity and femininity, are 
characterized respectively as rational and irrational, transcendent and 
immanent, active and passive, productive and reproductive, individual 
and collective, spirit and body. However, woman is not only associated 
with the negative. Because she is everything that man is not, she is both 
what he fears and despises, as what he hopes for and desires. De Beauvoir 
explains how woman, as “the Other,” can be both evil and good: “The 
Other is Evil; but being necessary to the Good, it turns into the Good; 
through it I attain to the Whole, but it also separates me therefrom; 
it is the gateway to the infinite and the measure of my finite nature.”
15
 
13. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley (London: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1997).
14. de Beauvoir, 16.
15. de Beauvoir, 175. “She is all that man desires and all that he does not attain. She 
is the good mediatrix between propitious Nature and man; and she is the temptation 
of unconquered Nature, counter to all goodness. She incarnates all moral values, from 
good to evil, and their opposites; she is the substance of action and whatever is an 
obstacle to it, she is man’s grasp on the world and his frustration: as such she is the 
source and origin of all man’s reflection on his existence and of whatever expression 
he is able to give to it . . . He projects upon her what he desires and what he fears, 
what he loves and what he hates. And if it is so difficult to say anything specific about 
her, that is because man seeks the whole of himself in her and because she is All. She 
11mff, wouters
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Nature and the bodily existence of humans can be valued either nega-
tively or positively. When women are opposed to men and placed lower 
in the hierarchy, women are viewed negatively, but inasmuch as they 
complete men and provide the material foundations for humankind, 
they are viewed positively. So, on the one hand, we must attend to the 
principles that structure the relation between self and other, namely 
hierarchy, relationality, and the union of opposites, and, on the other 
hand, we must take into account the specific characteristics that are 
ascribed to women in this system: immanence, which involves corporal-
ity and sexuality, mediation, and collectivity. These characteristics are 
ascribed to women because they describe a principle that is lower in the 
hierarchy, that complements the higher principle to which it is opposed 
but also essential. How do medieval conceptions of gender correspond 
to this theory? We find that, if we want to give a general overview of 
medieval systematic thinking about gender (which is, of course, different 
from the lived experience of gender), these principles apply very well 
to the Middle Ages. I am taking the broad category of “gender in the 
Middle Ages” here to refer to the structures of gender that supposedly 
did remain stable through the myriads of changes, negotiations ,and 
contestations that make up the concept of gender at any given time 
and place. Concepts such as the relation between self and other or the 
immanence that is ascribed to women seem broad enough to carry all 
of the theories that I will discuss and that pertain to different times 
and places. The crucial point in my discussion will be how binary and 
hierarchical ways of seeing gender are related.
In 1990, Thomas Laqueur proposed a radically new way of looking 
at the history of sex and gender in his seminal work Making Sex: Body 
and Gender from the Greeks to Freud.16 Building on Michel Foucault’s 
theories of sexuality and his own extensive study of historical accounts 
of anatomy, he posited that the western model of looking at sex and 
gender is only as old as the Enlightenment. Before that period, he claims, 
“men and women were arrayed according to their degree of metaphysical 
is All, that is, on the plane of the inessential; she is all the Other” (229).
16. Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
12mff, wouters
http://ir.uiowa.edu/mff/vol53/iss2/
perfection, their vital heat, along an axis whose telos was male.”
17
 So, 
not only gender but also sex was a matter of degree and place in the hier-
archy. In fact, Laqueur asserts that, whereas we now view the physical 
body as “real” and cultural meanings as “epiphenomenal,” earlier periods 
would have seen sex as an epiphenomenon to the primary category of 
cultural gender: “To be a man or a woman was to hold a social rank, a 
place in society, to assume a cultural role, not to be organically one or 
the other of two incommensurable sexes. Sex before the seventeenth 
century, in other words, was still a sociological and not an ontological 
category.”
18
 However, medievalists have contested the extent to which 
Laqueur’s concept is applicable to the Middle Ages. Joan Cadden, while 
admitting that there is much evidence for Laqueur’s “one-sex model,” 
points out that there is as much, if not more, evidence to be found for the 
existence of other models as well.
19
 She advocates a view in which several 
differing, overlapping, and contrasting models exist within a culture at 
the same time. This is not Laqueur’s only generalization. He also focuses 
almost exclusively on anatomical treatises, especially the illustrations 
of female and male genitals as identical in form but reversed. Further, 
he sees the Middle Ages merely as the period that latently carried over 
ideas from Antiquity to the Renaissance. However, Galen’s treatise On 
the Use of Parts, the classical work that supposedly spread the theory of 
genital homology through the centuries, “did not play a direct role in 
the main conversation about reproductive roles, sex determination, and 
sexual pleasure in the natural philosophy or medicine of the late Middle 
Ages,”
20
 according to Cadden, and Katharine Park confirms that “before 
1500 [she] could find no convincing expressions of the idea of genital 
homology at all, even as an alternative to be discarded.”
21
 Laqueur’s 
model does not completely misrepresent medieval conceptions about 
sex and gender, but it needs to be modified. Of course, there certainly 
17. Laqueur, 5-6.
18. Laqueur, 8.
19. Joan Cadden. Meanings of Sex Difference In the Middle Ages: Medicine, Science, 
and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
20. Cadden, 108.
21. Katharine Park, “Cadden, Laqueur, and the ‘one-sex body,’” Medieval Feminist 
Forum 46, no.1 (2010): 99.
13mff, wouters
http://ir.uiowa.edu/mff/vol53/iss2/
was a hierarchy between the sexes. However, this does not mean that 
medieval people did not also imagine two sexes opposed to each other: 
“the binary opposition between men and women was extraordinarily 
strong in medieval society. Although theorists might write that females 
were defective males, their defects were significant enough that no one 




We may better understand how the idea of hierarchy and the binary 
model of sex were reconciled in the Middle Ages by taking a look 
at Christian Neoplatonist thought.
23
 In the Neoplatonist worldview, 
everything in between pure being and non-being finds itself in a posi-
tion of relativity: as an emanation from the One it is positive, but as a 
derived form of being it is negative. Such is also the case with men and 
women. Not only are they positioned within this hierarchy, with men 
at a higher level of being than women, but also “male” and “female” are 
used metaphorically to describe relations within the whole continuum. 
Maleness means spirituality, intellect, and soul, a higher position, while 
femaleness indicates materiality, the senses, and the body, or a lower 
position. At every level, two entities, a lower and a higher principle, 
come together to form a unity. Thus, woman is accorded a place that 
is lower in the hierarchy, and she basically functions as the material for 
men to inhabit, but she is not a defective man: her position is viewed 
as positive inasmuch as it complements man’s being. Also, Christianity 
values highly the self-sacrificing descent of a higher principle to lower 
regions, even if it does not value the lower principle in itself. Christ 
took on humanity to save all people, and his humanity corresponds to 
a female position. That women signified the humanity of Christ could 
be used to create a positive identity for themselves.
24
 We often find 
22. Karras, Doing unto others, 5.
23. See Joan M. Ferrante, Woman As Image In Medieval Literature: From the 
Twelfth Century to Dante (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 2; Londa 
Schiebinger, “Feminine Icons: The Face of Early Modern Science,” Critical Inquiry 
14, no.4 (1988): 673, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343667: “The most fruitful context 
for understanding the feminine icon is Christian Neoplatonism.” I will expand upon 
this in the following section. 
24. Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast; Fragmentation.
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imagery of gender reversals in medieval literature, although men use this 
rhetoric more than women, the latter stressing their humanity instead 
of their difference from men.
25
 Medieval writers and artists thus used 
gender imagery “more fluidly and less literally than we do,” which does 
not imply that social roles were any less strict or hierarchic, but which 
did open up symbolic possibilities.
26
 There is, of course, much that 
escapes from the hierarchical binary, characteristics and configurations 
of personifications that do not quite fit into this system. The study of 
these instances promises to be most interesting. I believe, however, that 
personifications were conceptualized within a way of thinking gender as 
binary and hierarchical and of seeing these two aspects as indissolubly 
intertwined. I do not think female personifications defy gender norms 
by their mere existence. Neither do I think that they inevitably conform 
to those norms. This article, sketching the position of personifications 
within the system, will not be able to show where they diverge from it, 
but this is not to deny that they often do. 
A Framework for Analyzing the Gender of Personifications
The most basic way of explaining the gender of the majority of late 
antique, medieval, and early modern personifications is by pointing out 
that they materialize abstract nouns of the feminine grammatical gender. 
If personification allegory relies on the “reification of language itself,”
27
 
such as the animation of nouns, then of course feminine nouns are rei-
fied as female persons. As Maureen Quilligan explains, “personifications 
of abstractions such as Philosophy and Nature take the feminine form 
primarily because allegory always works narratively by literalizing lexical 
25. Bynum, Fragmentation. Christina Cedillo, “Habitual Gender: Rhetorical 
Androgyny in Franciscan Texts,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 31, no.1 (2015): 
65-81, doi:10.2979/jfemistudreli.31.1.65.
26. Caroline Walker Bynum, “The Body of Christ in the Later Middle 
Ages: A Reply to Leo Steinberg,” Renaissance Quarterly 39, no.3 (1986): 434, 
doi:10.2307/2862038.
27. Maureen Quilligan, The Language of Allegory: Defining the Genre (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), 115. Maureen Quilligan, The Allegory of Female 




effects. The gender of abstract nouns made from verbs in Latin is always 
feminine … and so the personifications embodying these concepts take 
on the gender of the words: Lady Philosophy, Lady Fortuna.”
28
 This 
explanation was first used in modern times by Joseph Addison and has 
been used as a sufficient explication many times since.
29
 Evidence that 
grammar plays a role in determining the gender of personifications is 
the fact that, after grammatical gender declined in European vernaculars 
around the turn of the millennium, male personifications started to 
appear more often. In English literature, for instance, Alfred the Great 
translated Boethius’ Philosophia as the male Wisdom, and both Langland 
and Bunyan employed a majority of male personifications.
30
However, one of the earliest uses of the grammatical argument from 
a ninth century commentary on Boethius’s The Consolation of Philosophy 
immediately makes clear that we cannot rest content with the explana-
tion offered by grammar alone: 
[Boethius] conjures up a picture of Philosophy as a woman; and he 
imagines her in the form of a woman, because the word was spoken 
in the feminine gender in Greek and Latin; and because she leads 
her listeners on as if with some elementary principles to perfect 
knowledge, or like a mother she suckles her infants and feeds her 
sons; or because women are seductresses, and just as women allure 




28. Quilligan, Allegory of Female Authority, 24-25.
29. For a broader overview of the history of the grammatical argument, see 
Newman, God and the Goddesses; James Paxson, “Gender Personified, Personification 
Gendered, and the Body Figuralized in Piers Plowman,” The Yearbook of Langland 
Studies 12 (1998): 65-96 and “Personification’s Gender,” Rhetorica 16, no.2 (1998), 149-
79, doi:10.1525/rh.1998.16.2.149.
30. Newman, God and the goddesses; Helen Cooper, “Gender and Personification 
in Piers Plowman,” Yearbook of Langland Studies 5 (1991): 31-48.
31. Quoted by Cooper, “Gender and Personification,” 31. “Configurat sibi muli-
erem Philosophiam; ideoque in speciem mulieris Philosophiam configurat, quia et 
apud Graecos et apud Latinos feminino genere pronuntiatur et auditores suos quasi 
quibusdam rudimentis adducit ad perfectam scientiam uel uti mater teneros lactat et 
nutrit filios. Vel ideo quia mulieres allectrices sunt: sicut mulieres alliciunt uiros, ita 
Philosophia specie perfectionis suae allicit homines sapientes.”
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Philosophia’s gender is first connected to grammar, but then the author 
adds that it seems normal that philosophy would be represented as 
a woman because she feeds men with wisdom just like mothers feed 
their babies or because she allures men with the beauty of wisdom just 
like women allure men. The personification’s function is compared to 
certain roles which women perform, in particular those of mother and 
seductress. It is futile to try and detach grammar from social meaning, 
because we clearly see that feminine abstracta are associated with femi-
nine characteristics time and again. From the moment that a concept is 
personified, it becomes a person and thus it is assigned a gender and the 
corresponding social position, role, and behavior. From that moment, 
social gender is relevant to a personification’s gender.
There are other arguments to refute the deterministic power of gram-
mar. For example, Barbara Newman notes that male personifications 
are almost never of the kind she calls “Platonistic” as opposed to “Aris-
totelian,” “reading the former as epiphanies or emanations of a superior 
reality, the latter as ‘accidents existing in a substance,’ personified only 
for the sake of analytical clarity.”
32
 She claims that male personifications 
never become as real, emotionally accessible, numinous, and serious as 
female personifications. Therefore, not only is it so that female per-
sonifications are linked to feminine roles and characteristics, but also 
the female gender of personifications apparently assures the figure’s 
effectiveness in a way that maleness does not. Their gender is essential 
to the functioning of the personification as an emanation of the divine. 
Therefore, I will now proceed to give an overview of the critical literature 
drawing on gender theory in explaining the gender of personifications. 
I will draw together a variety of arguments and present them in the 
context of the framework that was sketched earlier. 
The Level of the Personifier: Women
According to de Beauvoir, woman is defined as everything that man 
is not: she is immanent and passive, she is nature, materiality, and the 
body. It may appear strange, then, that divine concepts would take on 
32. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 34.
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female shapes. However, the fact that women personify positive and 
even divine concepts does not necessarily mean that they are no longer 
women. On the contrary, feminine characteristics such as immanence 
and materiality and their status as object in relation to a male subject 
assure the effectiveness of personification allegory. I will first discuss 
how the position of women in the binary-hierarchical structure of gen-
der relations may contribute to the effectiveness of female personification 
allegory. First, personifications, as material renderings of an abstract 
idea, might be female because women, as opposed to men, are associated 
with immanence and materiality. Second, personifications, which medi-
ate between humans and the divine, might be female because women 
relate humans mutually. 
Materiality and Immanence
First, I will discuss the implications of the fact that materiality and 
immanence are coded as feminine. Because corporality is associated with 
femaleness, personifications might be female simply because they have 
bodies. But there is a deeper link between allegorical personifications, 
materialization, and femaleness. Medieval allegorical creation developed 
within the context of Neoplatonism.
33
 Late-antique Neoplatonists car-
ried forward to the Middle Ages the ideas that language is naturally 
linked to meaning and that allegory is capable of conveying knowledge 
about the divine.
34
 These ideas were brought into practice most notably 
by poets influenced by the so-called “School of Chartres,” namely the 
philosophical allegorists Bernard Silvestris, Alan of Lille, and Jean of 
Hauville.
35
 Two elements carry the narrative structure of their allegories: 
33. Peter T. Struck, “Allegory and Ascent in Neoplatonism,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Allegory, ed. Rita Copeland and Peter T. Struck (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010).
34. Struck, 57. 
35. See Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The 
Literary Influence of the School of Chartres (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1972); Jon Whitman, Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period 
(Leiden: Brill, 2003); Jon Whitman, “Twelfth-Century Allegory: Philosophy and 
Imagination,” in Copeland and Struck, Cambridge Companion to Allegory, 101-16. 
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cosmology and personification. For us, what is most important is the way 
in which cosmology and personification are intertwined. The creation 
and the constitution of the cosmos happens through emanation, which 
is depicted as a deeply gendered process. The universe is constituted by 
an immaterial entity that is wholly transcendent, “the One.” The One 
is the source of everything and contains everything that exists, but it is 
also situated above everything else. It creates the different dimensions 
of the universe by emanating “pure being.” The cosmos thus consists 
of ever-descending layers of meaning. A first level of emanation is the 
realm of Mind or intellectual reality. A second emanation is the realm 
of the Soul. This level in turn generates the world and everything that 
is material. How is this theory of emanation gendered? The creation 
of the cosmos is depicted as the descent of the masculine principle, 
which is one and all and in itself perfect, into the realm of the feminine, 
which is other and in motion. The universe is constituted by their con-
vergence. We thus recognize the binary-hierarchical model of gender 
and the concept of the female as “other.” In this model of the world, it 
is not surprising to find those natural powers that govern the cosmos 
personified as women. Bernard Silvestris, for instance, describes in his 
Cosmographia how the female Noys emanates from God, Nature from 
Noys, and Silva from Nature. Claire Fanger notes “how deeply issues of 
gendered embodiment are implicated Bernard’s lofty abstractions, in his 
considerations of the relations between divinity and the world.”
36
 Noys, 
Natura, and Silva are female because they represent the diversification 
of the primal unity, which is itself eternal and motionless. The higher 
principle, the “immobile unity of Being,” is represented as the masculine 
principle, while the lower principle stands for “plurality and motion,” 
marked by the imagery of the womb.
37
 Emanation is described as the 
process of giving birth. The generative aspect of the divine is feminine 
because women are associated with procreation and material existence. 
Another hypothesis building on these ideas comes from Gordon 
36. Claire Fanger, “The Formative Feminine and the Immobility of God: Gender 
and Cosmogony in Bernard Silvestris’s Cosmographia,” in The Tongue of the Fathers: 
Gender and Ideology In Twelfth-century Latin, ed. David J. Townsend and Andrew J. 




Teskey. Wondering why personification reverses the gender hierarchy by 
depicting elevated concepts as female, he gives the following explanation: 
“It seems that by conferring on personifications the feminine gender, 
matter is surreptitiously raised up from its logical place, which is beneath 
the lowest species, into the realm of abstractions, giving these something 
solid to stand on. What is the stuff out of which Shamefastness is made? 
She is made of her gender.”
38
 Materializations of abstract concepts take 
the female form precisely because they take on materiality. When a 
higher principle descends and clothes itself in materiality, this is depicted 
as a gendered process: the masculine principle clothes itself in feminine 
materiality. Teskey connects this to Platonic ideas about male form and 
female matter: “the project of cultural idealism is typically encoded as 
the masculine imprinting of a feminine other.”
39
 So, the male form of 
the abstract concept imprints itself in formless matter, which is female. 
Teskey further describes this process in Neoplatonist terms: “feminine 
agents are both examples of the universals they instantiate and living 
sources from which those universals cascade into the world.”
40
 So, just 
as Fanger noticed with regard to the Cosmographia, Teskey describes 
how personifications might be female both because they are emanations 
and because they give birth to matter through the process of emanation. 
In a footnote, he makes a remark that is similar to what Newman says 
about male personifications being less real. Teskey observes that male 
personifications in The Faerie Queene “are demonstrably physical, as if 
to make up for their relative insubstantiality.”
41
Further, notice how the imagery of the female body and especially 
its reproductive functions are used in this schema to explain cosmo-
logical processes. This is an important factor in the functioning of 
female personifications, which follows from the association of matter 
with femaleness. As a consequence of their belonging to the material 
realm, women are not allowed transcendence and are thus reduced to 
corporality. Paradoxically, however, men’s bodies remain the standard 







“human body,” and women’s bodies are marked as “other.” So, the female 
body is both “body” itself, as an undifferentiated mass, and the “other” 
body, with marked characteristics. As a consequence, women’s bodies 
are more value-laden than men’s, both negatively and positively. The 
female body, then, is a site for symbolism, and its parts carry meaning. 
Personifications, of which every body part and piece of clothing is read 
symbolically, can signify various things by means of their female bodies. 
For instance, giving birth and breastfeeding often serve as metaphors 
within a personification allegory. 
In conclusion, personifications are female because they are mate-
rial and immanent instances of abstracta—materiality and immanence 
being coded as feminine—and also because women’s bodies are more 
marked and value-laden than men’s and are therefore more readily used 
in symbolic configurations.
Relationality and Gender Roles
Second, I will discuss the implications of women’s place in relation to 
men within the hierarchy of gender. Women and their bodies are clas-
sified according to their sexual and familial roles in relation to men. 
The female gender of personifications therefore also or even primarily 
functions in relation to the imagery of sexual relations and familial 
ties, duties, and honor. Female personifications play the same role here 
as women in the patriarchal family. Women link men to each other, 
first, by reproducing the family and connecting men through blood 
ties,
42
 and, second, by representing the honor of the men to which 
they belong. Just so, personifications connect humans and the divine 
or humans mutually through family relationships, and they symbolize 
the family honor. 
There are many different constellations in which female personifica-
tions may fulfil this function. Personifications can relate individuals or 
groups to each other or to God. Mostly, these relations are hierarchical. 
42. As described by Claude Lévi-Strauss, Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté 
(Paris: Mouton, 1949), and from a feminist perspective by Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic 
in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex,” in Toward an Anthropology of 
Women, ed. Rayna R. Reiter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975).
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They also often involve implied third parties, who define the relation-
ship by being excluded from it. The personification functions either as 
a mediator or as a substitute: either she mediates between the parties 
and is herself related to both of them, or a whole group is united in her 
person. She can also be both at the same time. The personification can 
take on many roles, but the most important seem to be mother, daugh-
ter, and bride/beloved. I distinguish three general attitudes toward these 
personifications: they are honored, desired, and/or victimized. These 
reflect the attitudes that courtly literature exhibits towards women. 
Therefore, the literature on gender in courtly literature is of use in 
analyzing medieval female personifications. As in courtly literature, 
the family that is evoked is part of elite culture. Together with gender, 
this aspect is crucial to the functioning of female personifications. The 
personifications are not only female, but also of noble lineage. They 
demand respect and honor, and when their honor is endangered, this 
evokes serious anxiety and can have repercussions. However, they receive 
this honor through their relation to their male relatives, to whom they 
are subordinate. Thus, personifications make use of “the leverage that 
women had not as people, but as a conceptual category,” in the words of 
Daisy Delogu.
43
 The hierarchies of gender and class converge in these 
figures in order to transfer these hierarchies to all kinds of interpersonal 
or intergroup relations. As Delogu explains: “The gender binary that has 
pervaded thought and culture from the Middle Ages to our own times 
provides a ready-made and almost universally accepted hierarchy which 
can be deployed in a range of other contexts to express ideas about the 
respective situations of persons or groups.”
44
 Female personifications 
“structure relationships of inclusion and exclusion, establish hierarchies, 
and help to define both self and other.”
45
We will first look at how personifications might be used in order to 
define the self in relation to the divine. Humans are sometimes pictured 
in direct relation to the divine, but more often the relation is medi-
ated by a female figure such as Mary or female personifications. And 
even when there is a direct relation, we notice the tendency to picture 





this relation as one between a feminine and a masculine being. Either 
the human soul is described as Christ’s bride or God’s child, or Christ 
is feminized and takes on the role of a mother, in order to relate the 
human to God as a father. There certainly is a tendency not to relate a 
male human figure to the (ultimately male) divinity. 
Rosemary Radford Ruether has suggested two reasons why men 
“continually reinvented the ‘religious feminine.’”
46
 Her overview of 
divine female figures throughout history, Goddesses and the Divine 
Feminine, reaches the conclusion that such concepts were probably 
always invented to serve male interests. The first interest they served, 
according to Ruether, is to provide a way out of the dilemma that “a 
male monotheistic God and heterosexist culture” posed to men: “for 
males to love God meant that a human male must love a divine male.”
47
 
This would mean an “explicit elaboration of male-male eros,” which in 
such a culture would be forbidden.
48
 I think that this argument cannot 
hold: for reasons that I will not expand upon here, it is not possible to 
speak of hetero- and homosexuality in premodern periods.
49
 Instead, I 
would argue that these relations are male-female more because of the 
structure and hierarchy of gender as discussed earlier. In relation to the 
man, woman is subordinated, but all humans together are the woman in 
relation to God. “Masculine” and “feminine” are then used as a metaphor 
for “higher” or “stronger” or “more spiritual” versus “lower” or “weaker” 
or “less transcendent.” Medieval sexuality was thus seen less in the abso-
lute terms of two opposite sexes than in the relation between the higher 
principle of masculinity and the lower principle of femininity (embodied 
by men and women) that are necessarily bound up with each other as a 
sign of both human fallenness and redemption. So, because the relation 
46. Rosemary Radford Ruether, Goddesses and the Divine Feminine: A Western. 
Religious History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 303.
47. Ruether, 304.
48. Ruether, 304.
49. See David M. Halperin, “Is there a History of Sexuality?” History and Theory 
28, no.3 (1989): 257-74, doi:10.2307/2505179; James A. Schultz, “Heterosexuality as a 
Threat to Medieval Studies,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 15, no.1 (2006): 14-29, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4617242; Helmut Puff, “Same-Sex Possibilities,” in 
Bennett and Karras, Oxford Handbook of Women and Gender, 379-95. 
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between humans and the divine is a hierarchical relation, it is described 
in gendered terms, gender being perceived as the primary hierarchy. For 
instance, the fact that the soul is not only likened to a bride but also to 
a child indicates that this is not about “eros,” but about love and care 
within a relationship of unequal power characterized by dependence.
50
Ruether gives a second reason why men would invent goddesses. 
Referring to the goddesses of the ancient Near East, she argues that 
they protect men in power.
51
 Indeed, the relation of certain individuals 
or groups to the divine, through female mediators or by representing 
the group itself as a personification, can be employed to legitimate and 
preserve the power of those individuals or groups.
52
 In this case, the 
personification serves to relate people to each other rather than to God. 
Or rather, it sets off people against each other by relating some more 
closely to God than others. This construction serves two functions in 
society. First, it legitimizes existing power relations and the position of 
powerful groups in society by relating them to the divine. Second, the 




50. See Caroline Walker Bynum, “Jesus as Mother and Abbot as Mother: Some 
Themes in Twelfth-Century Cistercian Writing,” Harvard Theological Review 70, 
no.3,4 (1977): 257-84, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1509631. Bynum remarks that 
“[b]oth in references to earthly authority figures and in reference to God, a maternal 
image is an image of dependence or union or incorporation”(269). She further men-
tions that “sexually inverted images (i.e., calling men “women”) were part of a larger 
pattern of using inverted language to express personal dependence and the depen-
dence of one’s values on God” (272).
51. Ruether, Goddesses and the Divine Feminine, 303-4.
52. For instance, Hannah W. Matis, “Early-Medieval Exegesis of the Song of 
Songs and the Maternal Language of Clerical Authority,” Speculum 89, no.2 (2014): 
372-73, describes how Carolingian clerics identified themselves with (body parts of ) 
the bride of Song of Songs, whom they interpreted as a maternal figure, in order to 
legitimize and heighten their authority. By representing themselves as the mother-
figure in relation to the parvuli or children, they both excluded the laity and manipu-
lated power relations within their own ranks. 
53. For instance, David Nirenberg, “Conversion, Sex, and Segregation: Jews and 
Christians in Medieval Spain,” American Historical Review 107, no.4 (2002): 1065-93, 
doi:10.1086/532664, shows how in the literature of medieval Spain, sexual relations 
of any nature between Christian women and Jewish or Muslim men were depicted 
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An important precedent for this kind of medieval personifications is 
the Old Testament’s depiction of the Israelites as God’s beloved bride, 
which David Carr calls a “theological marriage matrix”: “In this matrix 
the believing community is depicted as the female spouse of the male 
god—called on to love that God with the exclusive love of a wife and 
punished for failure to do so.”
54
 Christians replaced the figure of Syna-
goga with Ecclesia but kept this tradition, as witnessed by the interpre-
tations of the Song of Songs as a love song between the Church and 
God.
55
 Although interpretations of the Song of Songs put the emphasis 
on desire and love, elsewhere the “theological marriage matrix” draws 
on gender roles such as the requirement of absolute faithfulness from 
the wife and the man’s dominance over her. The people are represented 
as female, then, because of the hierarchy and familial duties that exist 
between them and God.
But a figure such as the Church does not only enable a group of peo-
ple to enter into a relationship with God: they also, as individuals, enter 
into a relationship with the figure of the Church itself. Personifications 
of groups of people also connect the people in that group to each other 
and against other groups via the figure of personification, and in this 
process gender plays an important role. This aspect of female personifi-
cation allegory has not received much attention for the medieval period, 
but it has from theorists of the modern nation-state.
56
 I believe that the 
as the violation of the brides of Christ and the daughters of God and their violation 
as the violation of God’s rights. Conversely, there are the narratives in which pagan 
women are converted to Christianity and marry Christian men, which is depicted 
as a victory of one group over another, as in Sharon Kinoshita, “‘Pagans Are Wrong 
and Christians Are Right: Alterity, Gender, and Nation in the Chanson de Roland,” 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 31, no.1 (2001): 79-111.
54. David Carr, “Gender and the Shaping of Desire in the Song of Songs and Its 
Interpretation,” Journal of Biblical Literature 119, no.2 (2000): 239, http://www.jstor.
org/stable/3268485.
55. Friedrich Ohly, Hohelied-Studien: Grundzüge einer Geschichte der 
Hoheliedauslegung des Abendlandes bis um 1200 (Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1958); 
E. Ann Matter, The Voice of My Beloved: The Song of Songs in Western Medieval 
Christianity (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990); Ann Astell, The 
Song of Songs in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). 
56. Nira Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation,” in Women, Ethnicity and Nationalism: 
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core of these ideas could be applied to medieval personifications such as 
the Church too. Mrinalini Sinha lists four ways in which familial and 
gendered imagery—the nation as a “domestic genealogy”—functions 
in a nationalist discourse. First, the imagery represents the nation “as 
an innate or organic community” whose members are related by family 
ties, which naturalizes the state and its power over the citizens.
57
 Second, 
the nation represented as a relative can activate “instrumental passions”: 
Thus the nation in the form of an abused or humiliated mother 
appeals to her sons and daughters, albeit often in differently 
gendered ways, to come to her protection and restore her honor. 
Similarly, the nation as fatherland calls upon its sons and daugh-
ters to obey the father and fulfil their respective gendered duties to 
the nation. . . . Most often, perhaps, the nation is represented as a 




Third, the imagery naturalizes hierarchies both within and between 
nations and signifies “hierarchy within unity”: the message is that hier-
archies in and between groups of people are natural and benefit everyone, 
just as, within a patriarchal family, parents have power over children and 
husbands over wives.
59
 Fourth, the nation’s double role as a “force for 
both change and continuity” is negotiated via gender difference: women 
are identified with tradition and continuity and men with change and 
modernity.
60
 This description of how gendered imagery functions in 
establishing relations between people and groups is applicable to medi-
eval collective personifications too. The figure of the Church as a mother 
establishes the community of Christians as an organic community in 
which the members are bound to each other by family ties. Second, by, 
for instance, depicting her as a mother who is in need of help or whose 
The Politics of Transition, ed. Rick Wilford and Robert L. Miller (London: 
Routledge, 1998); Mrinalini Sinha, Gender and Nation (Washington, DC: American 
Historical Association, 2006).






honor is threatened, this imagery may be used to activate instrumental 
passions. A man’s honor is then made dependent on the sexual honor of 
the women that belong to him.
61
 Third, it naturalizes hierarchies, both 
between groups, as we see in the figure of the personified Synagogue, 
who represents the Jews but is superseded by the Church,
62
 and within 
groups, as we see for instance when the clergy identifies itself with the 
mother figure in order to claim natural authority over the laity.
63
 
Daisy Delogu’s recent book Allegorical Bodies: Power and Gender in 
Late Medieval France discusses in detail the use of the allegory of France 
and the allegory of the University of Paris during the Hundred Years 
War. These are personifications that mediate between political groups 
and the figure of the king. First, Christine de Pizan creates the mater-
nal figure of France, whose children are in conflict with their mother 
and among themselves. Delogu explains how “imagining Libera as a 
maternal figure imposes a bond of natural love among her children, 
and between the children/subjects and the kingdom.”
64
 The French are 
thus admonished to fulfil their civil duties as loyally as they would their 
filial duties. Delogu further hypothesizes that the allegorical figure of 
France should serve as an alternative for the figure of the king, whose 
“historical and textual absence” at that time prompted Christine de 
Pizan to “construct an alternative site or mechanism for the produc-
tion of political and social identity.”
65
 Second, Jean Gerson makes use 
of conventional notions of the family as well by creating the allegorical 
figure of the University as “the devoted and obedient fille du roy.”66 The 
allegory of the University allows Gerson to “construct a platform for 
61. See Nirenberg, “Conversion, Sex, and Segregation.” 
62. On the figure of Synagoga in medieval art, see Sara Lipton, “The Temple is 
my Body: Gender, Carnality, and Synagoga in the ‘Bible Moralisée,’” in Imagining the 
Self, Imagining the Other: Visual Representation and Jewish-Christian Dynamics in the 
Middle Ages and Early Modern Period, ed. Eva Frojmovic (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 129-
63; Nina Rowe, The Jew, the Cathedral and the Medieval City: Synagoga and Ecclesia in 
the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
63. Bynum, “Jesus as Mother”; Matis, “The Maternal Language of Clerical 
Authority.”





political action for himself, and for the University masters generally,” 
but because University is a daughter, she poses no threat to the king’s 
authority.
67
 Gerson’s University is both the king’s daughter and the 
mother of the masters and students. In this last function, she aids the 
translatio studii et imperii: “Just as real women served as instruments 
in the transfer of secular power, so too the female-gendered University 
reproduces knowledge, ensuring its transmission from one generation 
to the next.”
68
 Delogu thus finds that these personifications “conform 
to normative expectations of femininity for medieval women.”
69
 They 
appear as the courtly beloved, as the object of affection and desire, or 
as a mother. Sometimes, they are depicted as a victimized woman: “By 
portraying France as a damsel in distress, the authors of such allegorical 
fictions invite a masculine, and in particular chivalric, public to come 
to the aid of the kingdom, in accordance with medieval expectations of 
masculinity.”
70
 It is only medieval women of the nobility, however, who 
can play this role: these women often functioned as intermediaries at 
courts, and so do personifications.
71
 
One last instance should be mentioned to round off our overview of 
the literature on this aspect of female personifications. Emily C. Franco-
mano’s book Wisdom and her Lovers mentions Augustine’s use of the 
personification of Wisdom represented as “a lover who can be shared 
among male philosophers joined in their pursuit of enlightenment.”
72
 
She “strengthen[s] the homosocial and spiritual bonds among phi-
losophers,” thereby again representing the process of translatio studii.73 





71. See Schiebinger, “Feminine Icons,” 684. Schiebinger, talking about the female 
personifications of Science in the early-modern period, says: “The feminine icon was 
born and bred within elite culture, and I would argue that it represented women’s 
place in that culture more than it did real women of the past. Women’s role in the 
court and salon was one of mediation.”
72. Emily C. Francomano, Wisdom and Her Lovers in Medieval and Early-Modern 




tension in the combination of “the homosocial hermeneutics of wisdom 
literature and the imagined heterosocial and heterosexual relationships 
that men in search of Wisdom forge with her.”
74
 This triangular rela-
tionship between men and a desired woman, however, is described in 
feminist theory by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s book Between Men.75 The 
rupture of the continuum between nonsexual and sexual male bonds is 
disguised by positing the figure of a desired female; in other words, male 
philosophers’ relations with each other must be mediated by a female 
figure in order to banish the idea of sexual relations between themselves. 
This framework could also prove useful for female personifications. 
The main interest of Francomano’s book, however, is the “deep-seated 
anxiety about potential confusion between feminine imagery and real, 
extratextual women.”
76
 Authors who make use of the female personifica-
tion of Wisdom feel very acutely that they cannot at the same time make 
use of the feminine and avoid associating Wisdom with mere mortal 
women. Because of the fact that a female personification “look[s] like 
a woman, nurture[s] like a mother, sing[s] like a siren, please[s] like a 
bride, and share[s] her body like a common woman”—in short: answers 
to all the expectations of normative femininity—that she inevitably will 
be confused “with real, extratextual women.”
77
The Level of the Personified: Ideas
The functioning of female personification at the literal level thus revolves 
around corporality and gender roles. First, women are associated with 
corporality and earthly existence. Personification, the embodied form of 
an abstract concept, is female because embodiment is coded as female. 
Second, women are seen in relation to men. They structure and symbol-
ize relations and hierarchies between people. Female personifications 
too perform these female gender roles. So, to the question of why these 
concepts are materialized as female, the answer is that they are because 
74. Francomano, 2.
75. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial 
Desire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).




materiality itself is coded as female and because they mediate between 
humans and the divine, as well as between humans mutually, which is 
the symbolic function of women. The second question is now whether 
the concepts themselves are coded as female even when they are not 
materialized. 
Here, the principle of immanence returns. A personification is char-
acterized by immanence because in its human form it is part of earthly 
existence. But many immaterial concepts like Wisdom or the Church 
are characterized by immanence themselves, because they refer to the 
divine at work in the creation, the non-transcendent and therefore 
feminine features of the divine. Barbara Newman notes with regard to 
Hildegard of Bingen that “while masculine imagery of the Creator tends 
to stress God’s transcendence, feminine metaphors place the accent on 
immanence.”
78
 Similarly, personifications represent the workings of a 
transcendent God in his creation: Sapientia, Caritas, Ecclesia and the 
others are, in their most elevated form, emanations of God that are at 
the same time divine and active in people. Therefore, their immanence 
is best represented by the female form. As such, they become mediators 
between God and his creation: “Hildegard saw [the feminine] as the 
dimension in which mediation or, at a higher intensity, union between 
Creator and creature can be achieved.”
79
 Newman further connects this 
mediating function to specifically feminine modes of time: “The femi-
nine designations . . . evoke God’s interactions with the cosmos insofar 
as they are timeless or perpetually repeated.”
80
 
Simone de Beauvoir provides another argument: “Man feminizes the 
ideal he sets up before him as the essential Other, because woman is the 
material representation of alterity; that is why almost all allegories in 
78. Barbara Newman, Sister of Wisdom: St. Hildegard’s Theology of the Feminine 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 64. See also María Isabel Flisfisch, 
“Las figuras femeninas en la Symphonia de Hildegard de Bingen: Caritas, Sapientia y 
Ecclesia,” Revista Chilena de Literatura 62 (2003): 127-44.
79. Newman, Sister of Wisdom, 45.
80. Newman, 45. Newman then goes on to argue that the principles of the 
feminine divine—theophany, exemplarity, immanence, and synergy—can be seen as 
conditions of the Incarnation, which in Hildegard’s view is “an event beyond time and 
history in the sphere of the eternal, of the feminine divine” (46).
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language as in pictorial representation, are women.”
81
 In other words, if 
concepts are external to man, they are pictured as feminine because they 
are Other, even if they represent partly transcendental ideals. 
With regard to the personifications that represent collectivities such 
as a city, a nation, or a religious community, we can add that the figure 
of a woman also represents the concept of collectivity itself. The female 
is the marked gender, so that men are more easily perceived as individu-
als (depending on the intersections with ethnicity, religion, class, etc.), 
but women are always also perceived as a collective.
82
 Arguably, a male 
personification would be viewed more as an exemplar, a historical figure, 
or an autonomous power, but less as a collective entity or abstract con-
cept.
83
 Inasmuch as women are “the Other,” they are less differentiated, 
and inasmuch as they are the object to the male subject, they are granted 
less individuality, so that they can more easily be turned into symbols. 
The most comprehensive work on female personifications to date, 
Barbara Newman’s God and the Goddesses, follows this line of thought, 
but situates its arguments exclusively on the figural level. Newman is 
opposed to looking at female personifications merely as grammati-
cal or literary figures. She pleads for considering their theological and 
spiritual meaning. In doing so, however, she separates spiritual mean-
ing from social meaning and claims in effect that the two exclude each 
other. I want to argue that they do not and that the figural level of 
81. de Beauvoir, Second Sex, 211.
82. For instance, Hrabanus Maurus’s ninth-century De Rerum Naturis links 
figures from the Old Testament to the New and figures from both to all sorts of 
individuals or groups that play a role in salvation history. A quick scan of these 
typologies reveals that men are mostly seen as prefigurations of Christ, the devil, or 
groups of individuals such as priests, the apostles, or the prophets, while women are 
predominantly interpreted as the Church, the Synagogue, souls, or abstract concepts. 
Hrabanus Maurus, B. Rabani Mauri Fuldensis Abbatis Et Moguntini Archiepiscopi: 
Opera Omnia, ed. J.-P Migne (1864-1878; repr. Turnhout: Brepols, 1966).
83. Schiebinger, “Feminine Icons.” Schiebinger discusses the decline of female 
personifications of science at the beginning of the nineteenth century and their 
replacement by images of individual male scientists. Compare also the figures of 
Natura and Genius in Alan of Lille’s De planctu naturae and Jean de Meun’s Roman de 
la rose: while Natura is a personification of the concept of Nature, Genius is a repre-
sentative of the priesthood, not a personification of it.
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personifications can be traced back to the literal level. First, I will briefly 
reproduce Newman’s argument. She describes the “allegorical god-
desses” as a “third pantheon,” besides the saints and the old pagan gods, 
surrounding the monotheistic God of Christendom.
84
 She argues that 
female personifications “add an irreducible fourth dimension to the 
spiritual universe. As emanations of the Divine, mediators between God 
and the cosmos, embodied universals, and not least, ravishing objects of 
identification and desire, the goddesses substantially transformed and 
deepened Christendom’s concept of God, introducing religious pos-
sibilities beyond the ambit of scholastic theology and bringing them to 
vibrant imaginative life.”
85
 They derive their power from representing 
the “feminine aspect of God”: as women, they represent the aspect of 
reality that is earthly (emanated) and embodied, and as such they can 
function as mediators and objects of desire.
86
 The way in which Newman 
describes the functioning of female personifications thus corresponds to 
the arguments described in the previous section of this paper. However, 
for her, the fact that allegorical goddesses are idealized figures repre-
senting theological concepts means that they do no longer represent 
women: they are “female but not necessarily women.”
87
 She asserts that 
female personifications are not representations of women but modes of 
religious imagination. They offer a safe and efficient way to theologize 
about divine concepts, for instance because they can represent “God’s 
inner conflicts, so to speak, in much the same way that allegory enabled 
them to dramatize human conflicts.”
88
 Another reason for their exis-
tence would be the need to imagine divinity as both male and female, 
because “human beings come in two sexes.”
89
 She therefore insists that 
they “were not women: they did not have bodies, and although they 
were symbolically virgins, lovers, mothers, and brides, they bore no 
taint of mortal frailty.”
90
 Newman wants to separate positive feminine 
84. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 1.
85. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 2-3.
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symbolism from the often negative way that real women’s bodies and 
roles were perceived in society. She never specifies what she means by 
“female” and by “women” in separating the two, unless by pointing out 
that “Lady Philosophy suffers from no weakness of mind; Lady Poverty, 
though beautiful and nude, arouses no lust in St. Francis; Mater Eccle-
sia does not lack authority, nor is Frau Minne periodically unclean.”
91
 
These are all the negative aspects associated with women’s materiality as 
opposed to men’s more spiritual status: women are weak of mind, their 
bodies are unclean and arouse lust, and they lack authority. This is the 
view of women that arises when the gendered body and soul are seen 
in opposition to each other, and these are the qualities that do not get 
figuratively transferred to men in the symbolic realm. The aspects of the 
feminine that qualify for that realm are the aspects that are valued when 
body and soul are seen as a harmonic whole: in that case, the abstract 
concepts of the body, of complementarity, of erotic love, of gender 
roles can be used in the religious imagination. What Newman means 
is that it is possible to abstract women’s association with immanence 
and materiality from women’s lower place in society. I do not think 
that such an artificial separation can be maintained. What is actually 
valued in abstracted concepts such as materiality or motherhood is the 
celebration of the lower principle that upholds the higher principle, a 
celebration of the hierarchy itself. Women’s base materiality, on the one 
hand, and female symbolic materiality, on the other, are two sides of the 
same coin. It is the same system looked at from different perspectives: 
if one looks at women as opposed to men, one only discerns negativity, 
but if one zooms out and considers how women are necessary to men’s 
existence in providing the material from which they are formed, this 
might be considered positive. Therefore, I would contest the view that 
we can separate positively valued femininity from negatively valued 
femaleness, although this may have been what medieval authors tried 
to do. Newman says that the goddesses have no bodies. However, they 
signify positive female characteristics by being female: their body is 
the symbol by which they communicate their meaning. Also, when 
female symbols are transferred to men, we often see that they remain 
91. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 310.
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associated with women’s bodies, for instance when Christ takes on the 
role of a mother by being depicted with lactating breasts. Elsewhere, 
men are connected with female symbols because they deliberately want 
to take up a lower place in the hierarchy or they want to be able to relate 
to God as a woman to a man, meaning that traditional gender roles are 
implicated in these symbols. Even when authors stress positive female 
symbolism, this happens within a system that opposes female to male, 
and that values male over female. Female symbols do not stand on their 
own, and gender relations are also at work in the religious imagination. 
So, the figural level of personifications builds on the literal level; the 
concepts themselves have feminine associations, but this is rooted in the 
literal level and the female bodies of personifications. 
The Level of the Personification: Literary Figures
If we look at personification as a literary figure, we again find the same 
gendered concepts that make plausible the choice for female personifica-
tions. Whether personification is seen as a literary figure that has to be 
interpreted, as a figure that contributes to memorization, as an instance 
of figurative language, as a trope, or as allegory, the discourse for talking 
about it makes use of gendered conceptualizations. 
Daisy Delogu draws attention to how “the very processes of allegori-
cal writing and reading are imagined by their practitioners in gendered 
terms.”
92
 Allegorical reading was a “generative process” in which the 
male exegete drew meaning from the fecund body of the text.
93
 Further-
more, the allegorical text was frequently described as veiled, “and it was 
the object of the (again male) reader to strip allegory of its covering, to 
lay bare and possess allegory’s hidden meaning.”
94
 
Emily Francomano, given her focus on the personification of Wis-
dom, chooses to focus on the role of female personification in the arts of 
memory, which “implicitly valued this supposed incongruence between 
the material and the spiritual, the sensual and the intellective.”
95
 As she 
92. Delogu, Allegorical Bodies, 19.
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puts it, “[t]he opposition between woman and wisdom makes the per-
sonification all the more memorable.”
96
 Moreover, because wisdom is 
figuratively seen as “the body of desired knowledge,” it takes on the form 
of the desired female body.
97
 In this capacity, the personification offers 
both an emotional and an erotic stimulation to memorize her teachings.
More broadly, the Jewish Platonist Philo and the Christian Platonist 
Origen connected the literal level of the text with the body of the reader 
and the figural level with the soul.
98
 If the body is coded as female, then 
the literal level can be thought of as female. The outer appearance and 
gender of the personification are situated on the literal level. We can 
then not only connect the female body of the personification as a body 
to femaleness, but also connect the literal level of the allegory through 
the metaphor of the body to femaleness. 
James Paxson offers a similar argument on personification as a trope. 
He discusses how “personified characters in classical or early medieval 
literature were women because Personification as a concept (and itself 
personified) could be thought of as having the gendered qualities of the 
feminine.”
99
 First, tropes and figuration in general were characterized as 
feminine because women were associated with “ornamentation, seduc-
tion, excess” and with masking, dressing up, concealing, and translat-
ing.
100
 Woman stands for the non-transcendent aspect of reality, for the 
visible outer layer of an invisible reality (sometimes considered positively 
as an emanation, sometimes negatively as a concealment). Woman thus 
becomes a metaphor for figuration itself. Second, personification is “the 
figure of figuration,” too, because “[i]t is always already constituted 
according to the imaginary features of concealment, clothing, cosmetics, 
facades, and so forth. These descriptive concepts hinge on the structural 
96. Francomano, 5.
97. Francomano, 5.
98. David Dawson, “Plato’s Soul and the Body of the Text in Philo and Origen,” in 
Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period, ed. Jon Whitman (Leiden: 
Brill, 2003), 89-108.
99. Paxson, “Personification’s Gender,” 157.
100. Paxson, 168. See also Delogu, Allegorical Bodies: “The practice of allegory 
was also connected to a certain indeterminacy, instability, or multiplicity of meaning, 
suggesting that allegory, like woman, might be fickle or duplicitous” (19). 
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oppositions of insides/outsides, substrates/surfaces, unseen/seen, con-
tent/form, primary/secondary.”
101
 Tropes work by means of concealment 
and covering; because both personification and woman are metaphors 
for denoting this process, personifications take on female shape. 
The discourse on the concept of allegory is governed by the same 
metaphors. First, in Neoplatonist thought, allegory itself was seen as a 
form of emanation. The fifth-century Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus 
believed that literary texts offer indirect access to a higher level of real-
ity through allegory. According to Peter Struck, this “view of the One 
as an entirely transcendent entity that also still (somehow) manifests 
itself in visible, tangible, concrete reality, sets out a paradox that is a 
natural incubator of allegorical thinking.”
102
 Indeed, this way of think-
ing provided one of the foundations of the medieval understanding of 
allegory, mostly through the immensely popular reception in Western 
Europe of the works of Dionysius the Aeropagite, who might have been 
a student of Proclus. So, if allegory could be seen as a process of emana-
tion, it could be affected by the discourse on emanation as a process of 
feminine engendering out of the masculine immobile principle. Female 
personifications, then, are female because they are emanations at three 
levels: at the level of the personifier, because they are embodied; at the 
level of the personified, because they represent immanent concepts; and 
lastly at the level of the personification figure, because allegory itself is 
a form of emanation. 
Second, the structure of allegory, in Daisy Delogu’s words, is “predi-
cated upon a sustained and productive tension between form and mean-
ing, as well as upon a state of ontological alienation.”
103
 Paxson says 
the same when he declares that personification involves “the radical 
suspension of fixed ontic categories such as bodily/abstract, human/
non-human or living/non-living.”
 104
 According to him, this rhetorical 
subversion then spreads to the ontic category female/male. In Delogu’s 
account, the “ontological alienation” that characterizes (personifica-
tion) allegory “allows us to perceive a parallel between allegory and 
101. Paxson, “Personification’s Gender,” 172.
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women, themselves often cast, like allegory, as useful, but potentially 
untrustworthy, intermediaries.”
105
 This reminds us of Barbara Newman’s 
hypothesis that “Christians, accustomed to thinking of God as three-
yet-one, of Christ as God-yet-man, and of Mary as virgin-yet-mother, 
came to regard paradox itself as a touchstone of revealed truth,” and 
therefore saw the embodiment of a divine concept in female form as such 
an absurdity that it must be true.
106
 However, as Emily Francomano’s 
book about the literary reception of and responses to the female personi-
fication of Wisdom shows, when readers took notice of the incongruity 
between divine concept and female form—and they very often did—this 
was “a source of continual anxiety.”
107
 She finds repeated warnings not 
to confuse female personifications with real women. Therefore, I do 
not think that we must have recourse to the concept of paradox as such 
to explain the seeming illogicality of female personifications. I would 
suggest that it is not so much subversion that dictates personification’s 
gender as it is the association of femaleness with the corporeal and 
non-transcendent aspects of being human. This association, of course, 
although not paradoxical in itself, does give rise to paradox because it 
necessarily has to be denied in order for the exalted personification to 
function. Personifications derive their effectiveness from taking the place 
of women in the symbolic order, but any associations with negatively 
perceived elements of femaleness must be banned. The two cannot 
be separated, however, which causes the anxiety that Francomano has 
documented.
Conclusion
Personifications cannot be reduced to either grammatical figure or theo-
logical concept. The gender of personifications, then, cannot be reduced 
to either grammatical gender or ideational value. When it is personified, 
a concept assumes human shape and a human identity, which entails 
social identity and gender. Many scholars have contributed arguments 
about the female gender of personifications. Those arguments that build 
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on gender theory can be situated on three levels, namely the personifier, 
the personified, and the personification figure. I have given an overview 
of these arguments and suggested that the same principles return on all 
three levels and are grounded in the meanings accorded to female bodies 
and gender roles. The central concepts are alterity and relativity: women 
are defined as the “other” in relation to men. The masculine is either 
invisible and neutral or it is positive; the feminine is either negatively or 
positively defined in relation to the masculine. So, even when feminine 
qualities are valued, they are valued in the hierarchical relation to male 
qualities, which means that they are valued either for their otherness or 
for their complementarity. First of all, because men are associated with 
transcendence, women are associated with corporality, materiality, and 
immanence. Therefore, the material shape of personifications is female. 
Second, because the male body is seen as the standard body, the female 
body is marked and offers strong symbolic possibilities. Third, women’s 
otherness defines their roles in society: they are seen in relation to men 
and hierarchically subordinated to them. The functioning of personi-
fications in relation to humans and the divine is also governed by the 
principles of relationality and hierarchy. On the level of the personified, 
the same principles of immanence, otherness, and collectivity play a role, 
as well as the principles of hierarchy and relationality. Personifications 
may represent aspects of the divine, in which case these principles are 
idealized and elevated, but they are grounded in the same social system 
that relegates women to the lower place in the hierarchy. Finally, on 
the level of personification as a literary figure, we again encountered the 
principles of embodiment and materiality. The choice for female per-
sonifications is governed by a complex interplay of factors: by grammar, 
by the ideational value of the personified concept, and by the dominant 
literary discourse. What unites all these factors, however, is the one 
deciding factor: female personifications make use of the symbolic values 
of female bodies and the structure of gender in society, on the level of 
the personifier, on the level of the personified, and the personification 
figure. The conclusion must be that in becoming human, personifica-
tions become fully human. Female personifications, then, are not only 
female but also women. 
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